




As was stated before, in the traditional view personality has been seen from the 
point of view of personality itself, or rather, personality has grasped itself 
from itself. Hitherto, the view of personality is thus established with a self­
centered grasp of personality as its nucleus. This way of grasping personality, 
personality’s own self-capture of itself, can also be said to be already a captivity, 
a kind of self-attachment.
This is why in the preceding chapter I spoke of the standpoint of absolute 
nothingness or emptiness which breaks through this self-attachment, which 
negates the self-centered grasp of personality, and also why I spoke of person­
ality manifesting itself in its true Reality only when it appears in being one 
with, or self-identical with, absolute nothingness, which is its original mode 
of being. This standpoint of absolute nothingness is not, however, on the yon­
der side of what we are accustomed to calling our personality or self; rather it 
opens up this side of it, as the absolute this-side, so to speak. This emptiness 
(sunyata) is not the same as nihilum in nihilism.
I said before that nihilum has become abysmal in modem nihilism. This means 
the nihilum realized at the base of the world as well as of the self has extended 
even into the place of God. Nihilism asserts that man can be genuinely free 
and independent only by grounding his subjectivity on that nihilum. With 
this subjectivization of the abyss of nihilum, there has opened at the base of 
man’s self-being a plane beyond the pale of the divine order hitherto con­
sidered essentially ruling the self, a plane which does not allow anything, 
even God, to be above it. It is only here, according to modem nihilism, that 
man’s independence can be established in the true sense.
The anxiety of having nothing to rely upon, the sense of instability at being 
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deprived of all basis for settling down and dwelling peacefully, has become at 
once, just as it is, a standpoint of creative freedom which does not fasten on 
any existing thing. For man’s self-existence, nihilum has become a realm of 
“ecstatic” self-detachment. Nihilism has become existential.
In spite of this, however, there still remains in that nihilistic way of under­
standing nothingness a characteristic not wholly free from the bias of objecti­
fication, of taking nothingness as a “thing” which is nothingness. Of course, 
this comment does not amount to a denial of modern nihilism being an exist­
ential standpoint wherein the nihilum is essentially subjectivized. This nihilism 
founds itself unalterably upon the real experience of the nihilum which is 
realized at the base of all things, our own existence as well. It is a standpoint 
in which we ourselves become the nihilum, a standpoint which can itself be 
called the realization of nihilum. It has nothing to do with the concept of 
nothingness or the representation of nothingness.
Nevertheless, here the nihilum is seen at the ground of one’s own self-being 
as the groundlessness of that being; that is seen from the side of the self­
being. Therefore, it is seen outside one’s “being,” is found lying at the other 
side of, as an entity other than, the “being.” For instance, even in Heidegger’s 
statement that self-being is “held suspended out into nothingness”—although 
his standpoint is fundamentally different from contemporary types of existen­
tialism or nihilism—traces of such a viewpoint still remain. Already the fact 
that he speaks of the “abyss” of nothingness can be said to indicate this view­
point. Here vestiges, however faint, still remain of nothingness being repre­
sented as an entity which is nothingness.
As I said, this does not mean that here the representation of nothingness is 
being called in question. Rather, when standing on self-being we come into 
contact with nihilum opening up at its ground, nihilum comes to appear, in fact, 
as an abyss into which, as Heidegger points out, our self-being is held suspend­
ed out. But the point here is that the nihilum in this case is always a nihilum- 
for-us, that is, a nihilum encountered by us, we ourselves standing on the side 
of “being.” From this it follows that the nihilum is seen outside “being” of all 
things as well as of ourselves (outside beingness, so to speak), as something 
which is nothingness, as an entity absolutely other than beingness. It is the 
same with the common view that simply sets nothingness against beingness 
as its mere negation. The idea of nothingness in the West traditionally has 
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never been freed from such a view. But as for the sunyata (emptiness) we spoke 
of, there is a fundamental difference.
Emptiness in the sense of sunyata is emptiness only where it empties even 
the standpoint that represents it as something which is emptiness. It is 
originally self-emptying. This meaning of true emptiness signifies that true 
emptiness is not to be posited as an entity outside of and other than “being;” 
that rather it is to be realized at one with and as self-identical with “being.”
When it is said that “being is nothingness” or that “form is emptiness,” 
that does not mean that “being” and nothingness, taken first separately as 
two entities, are subsequently brought to connection. Viewed in the context 
of Mahayana thought, the primary principle of which is to transcend all duality 
emerging from logical analysis, the phrase “being sive nothingness” implies 
the demand that, in order to realize truly its meaning, one should place him­
self initially on the basis of this sive and see from there being as being and 
nothingness as nothingness. Of course, in our daily life we live in a situation 
in which being is viewed solely as being, a situation shackled by being. Once 
such a standpoint is broken through and negated, nihilum arises. The stand­
point of nihilum is, in its turn, a standpoint of viewing nothingness solely as 
nothingness, a standpoint which is shackled by nothingness; it is a position 
to be negated in its turn. It is then that emptiness, as a standpoint of absolute 
non-attachment free of this twofold attachment, makes its appearance.
Seen through such a process, emptiness is the completion in the direction 
of negation and can be called the absolute negativity, for it is a standpoint 
which has negated and thereby transcended nihilum, which was itself the 
negating transcendence of all being. It can also be called an absolute transcend­
ence of being, the transcendence here meaning the negation of, and emancipa­
tion from, a standpoint shackled in any way by being. And whenever a spot­
light is thrown upon this aspect of negativity or transcendence alone, empti­
ness can always be described as outside of and absolutely other than the stand­
point tied to being; although this should not mislead us into the aforemention­
ed conception that emptiness is an entity subsisting outside of and different 
from being.
In spite of its transcendence of the standpoint entrapped by being, or rather 
for this very reason, emptiness can reveal itself only under the character of 
self-identity with being, both presenting themselves originally together, and 
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as structurally inseparable from each other, in the sive. Therefore, the trans­
cendence just spoken of does not entail going away to something transcenden­
tally subsisting, called emptiness or nothingness. This is the reason as well 
I said before that emptiness is absolutely this-side, more this-side than what 
each person usually regards as his own “self.” Emptiness or nothingness is 
not something we can proceed to; not something we can find existing in front 
of us; it cannot, generally speaking, be represented objectively. No sooner 
have we assumed such an attitude than it withdraws.
It has often been pointed out about the ego-self that its subjectivity entirely 
refuses to be viewed objectively. Nevertheless, the self has a constant tendency 
to grasp itself emblematically as “something” which is called the ego. This 
tendency is inherent in the very making of the ego-self, which consists of self­
consciousness. It was therefore a great progress when the standpoint of “ex­
istence,” with its mode of being “ecstatic,” that is, of being held suspended 
out into nothingness, appeared. It meant the opening up of a stance appro­
priate to self-being in its true subjectivity. But, then, we must also recall 
what we said before: that there are still even in this standpoint traces of 
nothingness represented or posited as an entity which is nothingness. The 
standpoint of emptiness is one which transcends this subjectivistic nihilum, 
transcends it to the plane which is more this-side than the subjectivity of 
existential nihilism. Emptiness is the very standpoint which is unable to be 
objectified in any way whatsoever.
For this reason, what is called the abyss of nihilum originates, in fact, only 
in emptiness. For it to be represented as such an abyss is possible only in 
emptiness. In this sense, just as nihilum is an abyss to anything that exists, so 
emptiness may be said to be an abyss to the abyss of nihilum. Just as a chasm 
on the earth, no matter how unfathomably deep it may be, can be said to lie 
in fact in the boundlessly vast sky, so it is with nihilum and emptiness. Only 
by sky is not meant merely that which spreads out vastly over the chasm, 
rather that cosmic sky in which the earth, we human beings on it, and countless 
stars and planets exist and move; that which also underlies every place we 
tread, and lies at the bottom beyond the chasm’s bottom. If the place wherein 
omnipresent God resides is called Heaven, Heaven would also be found open 
at the bottom of bottomless Hell, and that Heaven would be an abyss in the 
same sense that emptiness is an abyss to the abyss of nihilum.
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Moreover, it is something which opens up more intimately this-side, some­
thing more directly and immediately here-and-now than we usually deem our 
ego-self or subjectivity to be. But just as while moving in the sky in the above 
sense, we usually forget this fact and look up at the sky only over our heads, 
we also fail to realize that we are, in fact, moving in emptiness, are, in fact, 
where we are more nearly this-side ourselves than we are in self-consciousness.
From the basic difference discussed hitherto between the standpoint of 
emptiness and modem nihilism, the former is not an atheism in the same sense 
in which the latter is. Still less is it akin to the atheism of positivism or material­
ism, which are oriented altogether differently from nihilism. The standpoint 
of emptiness, expressed in such phrases as “being sive emptiness,” or “form is 
emptiness; emptiness is form,” transcends negatively nihilism on the one hand 
and materialism and positivism on the other. But, at the same time, this 
standpoint seems to imply a possibility to bring into some higher synthesis 
the truthful factors that are contained in the basic intentions and motives of 
these two opposite standpoints. This problem will be touched upon later. 
Furthermore, if it is not an atheism in the word’s usual sense, it goes without 
saying that the standpoint of emptiness is not a type of so-called theism.
In the preceding chapter,1 Eckhart was given as an example in the West of 
a standpoint which does not belong to the sphere of the either-or of theism 
and atheism. Grasping the personal relation of God and man as a living relation 
between imago Dei in the soul and its archetype, Eckhart at last dares to call 
“nothingness” the entirely “formless” Qildlos^) Godhead, a plane that trans­
cends all forms, and considers the soul to return to itself and acquire absolute 
freedom only when it absolutely becomes one with the nothingness of God­
head. This is not mere theism, and of course neither is it mere atheism. (For 
this reason, it was often mistakenly called pantheism.) This nothingness as the 
“ground” of personal God, while constituting the yonder-side background of 
God, is realized by man immediately as his “soul’s ground,” on the this-side 
foreground of his own self. We are able to perceive in this that the conversion 
to the standpoint I have described as absolute this-side is also comprised in 
Eckhart. Then, however, the standpoint of emptiness is one which appears 
when such a conversion has been achieved with definite clarity.




Of course, even in Buddhism, which expounds the standpoint of emptiness, 
a transcendence to the yonder-side, or “other-shore,” is spoken of. But in this 
case the transcendence is realized as a disclosure of a horizon which may be 
called absolute this-side in the sense that it has transcended the opposition 
between yonder-side and this-side. The essential characteristic of Buddhism 
can be said to consist in its being the religion of the absolute this-side.
In Eckhart’s case it is nothingness, in which, as he says, God’s ground is the 
soul’s ground and the soul’s ground is God’s ground, that holds the plane where 
arises the personal relation of God and man. It is on the basis of nothingness 
that the actual form of being of all entities including God comes to appear 
as such. It is also only on the basis of nothingness that entities being repre­
sented as God, soul, and their relation is made possible.
It is the same with the standpoint of emptiness. As I said before, only in 
emptiness does the abyss of nihilum come to appear, and only in emptiness is 
it represented as an abyss. And this same emptiness is the only area where God 
and man in their personal form of being and their relation to each other, res­
pectively, come into being; the only field where their representations are made 
possible. And yet, this field of emptiness opens up on the absolute this-side 
of what is deemed our ego-self or subjectivity.
VI
It may perhaps sound highly curious, almost fantastically absurd, to say that 
emptiness is the only field upon which such things as what modern nihilism 
calls the abyss of nothingness, and what older religions have called the personal 
relation of God and man, come to be present and represented; that, moreover, 
this emptiness is absolute this-side. This is no doubt true according to ordi­
nary reasoning or to current philosophical or theological ways of thinking.
But is it really so strange? Is it not rather the opposite, that a character of 
“fantasy” in the original sense of the word, that is, the image-drawing and 
representative character, still lingers in what is termed the abyss of nothing­
ness and the personal relation of God and man? Of course, though I say the 
image-construing and representative character remains, I do not mean that 
they are solely mental images, mere products of imagination in the sense in 
which Feuerbach and other critics of religion would hold them to be. The nihil 
or nihility is not a merely subjective feeling, fantasy, or idea. It is a reality as 
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real as the fact that we really exist. It is not, moreover, something remote from 
our everyday life. It is that in which we constantly live and move. It is just 
because our everydayness is so much everyday, because we are so much 
wedded to everydayness, that we fail to perceive the reality of nihilum.
For instance, we like to think that we feel close familiarity with our family 
or friends, that we are intimately acquainted with them. But after all, do we 
really know essentially even those with whom we are most intimately ac­
quainted? The usage here of the word “essentially” should not be thought to 
connote the idea, for example, of our not knowing another’s inmost thoughts, 
regardless of his closeness to us, or the idea of there being always something 
inaccessible between even the closest of friends. Were the word used in this 
sense, we would have to say that neither the secrets of our own heart nor our 
own personal character is adequately known even to ourselves. Rather, I used 
the word “essentially” in connection with the immediately present home-ground 
on which a person with whom we are familiar appears directly before us. We 
no more know whence comes and whither goes our most intimate friend than 
we know whence we ourselves come and whither we go. We do not know the 
home-ground of this person’s existence who is actually standing face to face 
with us. He is, originally and essentially, a stranger to us.
Of course, my friend is not a stranger in the sense of a person I happen to 
encounter by the roadside on a trip; in that sense he is one with whom I am 
most intimately acquainted. Nevertheless, this sort of familiarity is in truth a 
familiarity with the absolute abyss in between. Compared to this essential 
distance in between, even a stranger in the street is infinitely more familiar. 
Essentially, all men, whether close to us or remote from us, are “strangers” to 
us in absolutely the same degree.
This does not hold true only of human beings. For example, the small 
flowers that bloom before me in my garden grow from seeds, will return to the 
earth before long and never reappear as long as this world exists. Again, man 
does not know whence these small blooming faces come and whither they 
go. Behind them there lies absolute nihilum, which lies equally behind us and 
between these flowers and me. Separated from me by the abyss of that nihilum, 
the flowers in front of me remain unknown to me.
Yet man gives names to persons and things, and then believes that if he 
knows their names he knows the things themselves; that because he has once 
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seen something somewhere, he therefore is acquainted with it. The more 
intimately we associate with them, talk with them, and have contact with 
them, the more they become known to us and the closer we are to them. 
They become our acquaintances, our family members, our primroses.
Seen essentially, that is, there where they originate as they are in nihilum, 
all things are nameless, unnameable, and unknowable. But in the everyday 
world, whose element is no other than names, the reality of nihilum is covered 
and hidden; the ground of being, the home-ground of the existence of all 
things, is thoroughly buried and forgotten. The world around us thus becomes 
a world which consists only of things already known or able to become known 
to us: that is to say, it becomes an all too “everyday” world, in which we forget 
the essence of things even while concerning ourselves with them.
But then what is it like, the aforesaid “abyss of nihilum” which separates us 
even from those most familiar to us? It lies behind everything in the world. 
Even the Milky Way, the galaxies and nebulas, cannot be apart from it. And 
this cosmically omnipresent nihilum is the same nihilum that separates us by 
making us essentially unknown to each other. We can say that the Milky Way’s 
planets spread out and the galaxies and nebulas whirl about in that bottomless 
rupture between us even as we are engaged in friendly conversation. This 
means that we who are sitting face to face in the same room are both standing 
outside the whole universe; that we are sitting face to face as bodies and minds 
immediately manifesting themselves on nihilum, wholly unknowable of whence 
or whither. This is the abyss of nihilum.
If emptiness is an abyss even to that abyss of nihilum, then what has just 
been said of the latter can apply equally to the former, now in a truly absolute 
sense. In the mode of being where form is emptiness and emptiness is form, 
the “forms” (i.e., all things) are each absolutely nameless, unknown, unknow­
able, and separated from each other by an absolute rupture. However, in 
contrast with the field of nihilum in which the desolate and bottomless abyss 
opens up the essential distance even between us and those who are most fami­
liar to us, the field of emptiness is one in which the absolute severance signifies 
in turn the most intimate encounter with all beings. Emptiness is where we are 
originally in the same essential contact with what ordinarily is to be called 




As used here, “essential encounter” means an encounter taking place on the 
ground where originates both our own being and that of what we encounter, 
where self and other are, in togetherness, each truly their own respective selves. 
And here, all things can encounter one another within the equality beyond 
distinctions of gratitude and revenge, hatred and love. No, the word encounter 
is already inadequate here. For just as a ray of light that manifests various dis­
tinct colors in a prism is a beam of white light, so where self and other are each 
truly in and by themselves, they are at once absolutely separated and absolute­
ly united, or rather, absolutely self-identical. They are an absolute two, and at 
the same time, an absolute one. The Zen master Daito Kokushi once said: 
“Separated from one another by ioo million kalpas, yet not apart a single 
moment: sitting face to face all day long, yet not opposed for an instant.” 
I would like later to enter into more detailed discussion regarding such a mode 
of being in emptiness.
vn
The absolute this-side referred to above is entirely at one and self-identical 
with our self as body and mind. I tried earlier to give expression to this by 
quoting a poem by Gasan Joseki:
The conscious mind of this shadowy man
At all occasions is to me most familiar—
From long ago mysteriously wondrous,
It is neither I nor other.
This has also been given frequent expression in the illustration of waves and 
water. The incessantly rising and falling waves revert to water as a whole, 
and the water in turn enters into the waves. Therefore, authentically, both 
must be negated: “the waves” apart from water and “the water” apart from 
waves. And yet just where the water and the waves are self-identical (as water­
waves), is the place where the very thing (that is, this fluid with its wetness) 
is presenting itself in its own reality, water being there truly water and waves 
truly waves. This may serve to illustrate the place of sunyata as the absolute 
this-side.
However, insofar as we ourselves do not turn to and enter into this-side, 
insofar as we remain simply as beings of body and mind or even as rational or 
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personal beings, the absolute this-side is for us always the absolute yonder-side. 
This is just the situation that basically determines our ordinary mode of being.
In our ordinary mode of being, that is, insofar as we simply remain as beings 
of body and mind, rational or personal beings, our body-mind with its self­
centered consciousness grasps itself from itself; our reason grasps itself by 
being based upon reason, and our personality grasps itself from within the 
personality. Each of these (i.e., the body-mind, reason, personality) is estab­
lished with an inherent self-grasp as its core; is thereby established as some­
thing confined within itself and complete, as something well-defined which is 
called the self with body and mind (or body and soul), reason, or personality. 
Moreover, the self-grasp which constitutes their core is always, as was stated 
before, a state of captivity, including basically a sort of narcissism. It entails 
self-captivation; it is the essential self-attachment. Even reason and personality 
do not arise without being accompanied by self-attachment in this essential 
(that is, ontological) sense.
The self-grasping in this sense is ever an act we ourselves perform. As beings 
with body and mind, we grasp ourselves and are captured by ourselves in our 
own body-mind. As rational or personal beings, we grasp ourselves and are 
captured by ourselves in our own reason or personality. Here, however, our 
own act does not mean an act we perform by our wanting to do it. It is not an 
act which depends on our arbitrary will that we might stop any time we want­
ed to. It is an act we are performing long before we intend to do it.
We can possibly say that a kind of destiny is here at work, a force causing us 
to act and be this way. All possible rational, personal beings, beings of body 
and mind, that appear in this world appear as beings with such a mode of 
existence, performing in such a way. It seems as if when life, consciousness, 
personality, or reason, each as a whole, appears from the depths of the world so 
as to become individualized and immanent in each individual being, they be­
tray an essential characteristic of falling into a sort of narcissistic self-attach­
ment. Here we see a kind of necessity, very much like the force of destiny. 
But it is not destiny in the ordinary sense in which it simply rules over us and 
moves us from without. It is not merely blind will. It is a destiny which appears 
only under the guise of our own acts, and only at one with our own acts.
And yet insofar as we remain simply as beings of body and mind, rational or 
personal beings, we are in confinement. And to that extent, we are essentially 
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attached to self. In other words, we ourselves shut out the standpoint of 
emptiness which is our absolute this-side. Again, to that extent, the absolute 
this-side must forever remain for us the absolute yonder-side. This essential 
self-attachment and self-confinement, however, is none other than the situation 
that basically determines our ordinary mode of being.
It is, in my opinion, in the abovementioned case that the yonder-side truly 
comes to possess its absoluteness for us. In comparison, in other cases the yon­
der-side is not yet absolute. For example, when Plato conceives of a world of 
Ideas as the yonder-side of this sensory world, its beyondness is so only similar 
to that of a celestial world “high above” and beyond the terrestrial world. It is 
a yonder-side that is looked up to perpendicularly from the “earth.” It arises 
solely with a ninety-degree turn from the ordinary, everyday life in which 
men are absorbed. This would be yonder-side for those located on the “earth” 
as set forth in a Ptolemaic point of view. But for those located on a field analo­
gous to cosmic space, the field of emptiness in which “heaven” and “earth” are 
established on the same level, it would be no longer the yonder-side.
When, as in the common representation of Christianity, a personal God is 
considered to reveal Himself vertically from Heaven to earth, God’s place is 
also conceived as the yonder-side. Since here it is revelation from beyond, the 
yonder-side is much more genuinely yonder-side than in the case of Plato. It is 
a yonder-side vertically revealed from Heaven to earth. Still, even this must 
be said to be fundamentally the same as the former. The same nature of “yon­
der-side” obtains: heaven standing against the earth. The only difference is 
that in Plato the direction from earth to heaven (the direction of eros) pre­
dominates, while in Christianity it is, conversely, from Heaven to earth (the 
direction of agape). They tally exactly in the respect that in both cases the 
yonder-side arises in making a ninety degree turn.
Even though an absolute break is posited between God and man in Christi­
anity, it still allows room for God, man, and the break between them to be 
represented within the same scenery, so to speak. In fact, from long ago in 
Western Geistesgeschichte we see that philosophy, in its competency of meta­
physics, has incessantly presented the domain of reason or logos as the stage 
for their ontological representation. Reason develops a horizon of “thought,” 
in which yonder-side and this-side, God and man, which are usually held not 
to belong to the same level, can be represented side by side. Even when an 
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absolute break or unrelatedness is supposed to exist between them, philo­
sophical reason unfolds the horizon of “dialectical” thought, in which such an 
unrelatedness can also be conceived of as a sort of relation in the form of un­
relatedness, that is, as a dialectical relationship.
If we turn next to the “abyss” of nihilum, we can say that here the yonder- 
side in its original sense is not present as it is in the aforementioned two cases, 
for this abyss belongs to this-side. But insofar as the abyss is represented as 
something coming in sight right at the ground of our own existence, a yonder- 
side character still clings to it. It is also a yonder-side that appears at the right 
angle turn, although in this case, contrary to the former, the turn is directed 
from the earth into its own depths. Therefore, the depth of the earth is still 
something that can be represented within the same scenery as the earth; that 
is, the “nothingness” of the nihilism can be represented philosophically on the 
same level as “being.”
The standpoint of emptiness is completely different: here what I mean by 
emptiness is absolute openness in the sense that, while presenting itself as the 
field in which the yonder-side in the direction of heaven as well as the beyond 
in the direction of the depths of the earth can both be established and repre­
sentatively conceived, it is in itself sheerly unable to be represented in any 
way whatsoever and so is always present as the absolute this-side. This is why 
I said before that both the abyss of nihilum and the personal relation of God and 
man can arise and be represented in emptiness.
Thus we may say the standpoint of emptiness is manifested in a one hundred 
and eighty degree turn, as the field in which two ninety degree turns are 
involved, one taking place in a heavenward direction and the other earthward 
to the earth’s depths. It is comparable to passing from the front to the back 
of a canvas depicting various scenes of heaven and earth. In other cases, e.g., 
in the relation of Ideas and sense objects, God and man, being and nihilum, 
the yonder-side appears as something drawn on the surface of a canvas, no 
matter how resolute a separation is supposed to exist between them.
Further, when the standpoint of emptiness is thoroughly penetrated—and 
the direction of this penetration is, as was said before, one in which “emptiness” 
itself is also emptied—then the standpoint of emptiness appears in a three 
hundred and sixty degree about-face: that means in a manifestation of 
the self-identity of the front and the reverse. The field wherein emptiness is 
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emptied to become true emptiness is none other than the place where each and 
every thing appears in its own reality, in its true suchness. It is the field where­
in the zero degree means at once three hundred and sixty degrees. Therefore 
in spite of, or rather because of it being essentially absolute this-side, it can also 
be absolute yonder-side. This is because only zero degree can also be three 
hundred and sixty degrees.
That is, this absolute this-side is on the one hand a place where beings, 
rational, personal, or with body and mind, essentially die to themselves, a place 
where man extricates himself from the essential self-attachment mentioned 
before; in brief, the place of emancipation in the Buddhist sense, or what 
Eckhart calls Abgeschiedenheit (detachment). On the other hand, the same 
absolute this-side is the place of the essential life of beings that are rational, 
personal, or with body and mind; the place where beings absolutely unname- 
able have their names and live in the everyday world whose element is names. 
In short, it means the place of man’s death sive life and fife sive death, man here 
being taken as a whole, including his body and mind, his rational and personal 
modes of being.
Emptiness as the absolute this-side cannot, of course, be said to be some­
thing that exists somewhere. Something represented as emptiness, or posited 
as emptiness, is not genuine emptiness. What is genuine emptiness is none 
other than what comes to man’s self-awareness as his own absolute selfhood. 
This emptiness at the same time is the field wherein each and every being 
comes into its own reality and appears truly as and in itself. It is the field 
wherein the awakening of our true selfhood—or, what is the same, our selfhood 
as true self-awareness—and the suchness of each and every thing as it is arise 
simultaneously, as one or self-identically.
In this case, however, the term self-awareness does not simply mean self­
consciousness, nor the term selfhood the ego or the subjectivity of an ego-self. 
Neither is reality or real “suchness” used here in the sense it is in ordinary 
realism or materialism. In that interpretation, things are already objectified 
and represented in opposition to and outside of the ego. No matter how em­
phatically they are said to be “outside” of consciousness, they cannot escape 
the implication that insofar as they are conceived as being “outside” they 
are still seen from the field of consciousness.
Reality as suchness means the manner of something’s being beyond all 
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representation or thought, of its being inaccessible to the ego’s grasping: 
and therefore, its manner of being “ungettable” in the specifically Buddhist 
sense. This is the mode of being of something when, on its own home-ground, 
it is as it really is. For this reason, even though the term thing as and in itself 
is here applied to such a mode of being, it has nothing to do with Kant’s 
concept of “thing in itself.” Also, even if it is here said that our own selfhood in 
its true self-awareness and the suchness of things come into being as one, self- 
identically, this is not the same as the standpoint of the “unity” of subject 
and object that appears in various guises in the history of philosophic thought 
both East and West, whose basic characteristic lies in starting from the 
presupposed dualism of subject and object so as to induce them to a subsequent 
unification where they will vanish. The absolute this-side, contrarily, is not 
some unification brought forth as a result, but the originally selfsame place 
of absolute openness or emptiness which nevertheless is at once our own 
home-ground, each of us being here in his true selfhood and self-awareness, 
as well as things’ own home-ground, each thing being here truly in and as itself. 
This standpoint is neither monism or dualism of any kind. It is the absolute 
self-identical One which is, as it is, the absolute Two.
But the question will inevitably arise whether this is possible, and if so, how. 
What is the mode of being of things, when we say that it is only in emptiness 
that they are on their own home-ground? To put it the other way around: 
what does “in emptiness” mean, when we say it is only in emptiness that 
things are disclosed in their own reality? After all, when we say “form is 
emptiness, emptiness is form,” what is the mode of being of “form” (ex­
isting things), and the meaning of emptiness? In emptiness, moreover, that 
things are really on their own home-ground in their suchness and beyond all 
representation or conception, that they are there in themselves, means precise­
ly that there our individual selfhood opens up on and as the absolute this-side, 
that our selfhood is realized in its true self-awareness. How can this be pos­
sible?
The problem is revealed, for example, in words from Dogen’s Genjokdan: 
“That one’s self conveys itself to and practices and confirms all things, is il­
lusion. That all things advance forward and practice and confirm the self, is 
enlightenment.” And, from the same work: “To learn the way of the Buddha 
is to learn one’s self. To learn one’s self is to forget one’s self. To forget one’s 
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self is to be confirmed by all things. To be confirmed by all things is to make 
the mind and body of one’s own self as well as the body and mind of other selves 
drop away.”
What mode of being of things renders it possible for them to come and prac­
tice and confirm one’s self, or for one’s self to be confirmed by them? Why is 
this at once the dropping away of the body and mind of one’s own self and 
the body and mind of other selves?
To give another example. Muso Kokushi says in his Muchu Mondo (“Ques­
tions and Answers in a Dream”): “Hills and rivers, the earth, plants and 
trees, tiles and stones, all of these are the self’s own original part.” Again: 
“It is not that the field of that original part lies in body and mind, or that it 
lies outside body and mind, or that body and mind are precisely the place of 
the original part, or that the original part is sentient or non-sentient, or that 
it is the wisdom of Buddhas and saints. Out of the realm of the original part 
have arisen all things: from the wisdom of Buddhas and saints, to the body and 
mind of every sentient being, and all lands and worlds.”
What does this “original part of the self” indicate? What does it mean, that 
hills and rivers, the earth, plants and trees, tiles and stones, all constitute the 
original part of the self, that they all have arisen out of the realm of that original 
part? (To be continued)
Translated by Yamamoto Seisaku
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